One Country’s Pirate:
Why Russia is Really Worried About That Tanker Seizure
I was watching Belle of the Ranch today - the channel that used to be Beau of the Fifth Column - and she was reporting on something that stopped me cold. Russia’s foreign minister had issued a statement asking the United States to please explain their legal justification for seizing that Venezuelan oil tanker. He wants us to clarify, “out of respect for other members of the world community,” what facts led us to take such actions.
My first reaction was the obvious one: Really? Russia? You’re lecturing people about respecting international norms while you’re three years into invading Ukraine? That’s some world-class chutzpah right there.
Belle nailed the absurdity perfectly in her commentary. Here’s a country currently attempting to seize an entire neighboring nation, asking for careful legal explanations about proper respect for sovereignty and international law. It’s like getting a lecture on property rights from someone actively ransacking your house.
But then I got to thinking about it. And the more I thought about it, the more I realized: Russia’s foreign minister isn’t just making rhetorical points about hypocrisy. He’s genuinely worried. And he has good reason to be.
The Precedent That Keeps Russian Oil Ministers Up At Night
See, when the United States seized the Skipper - that Venezuelan oil tanker carrying 2 million barrels of crude - they established something important. Not through careful legal reasoning (Trump literally said “we keep it, I guess” when asked what would happen to the oil), but through raw demonstration of power.
The precedent is simple: If a vessel is sanctioned, it can be seized in international waters. The cargo becomes... well, whatever the seizing nation decides it becomes.
Now, why would that worry Russia specifically?
Let me walk you through Russia’s current oil export situation, because it’s genuinely precarious:
The Black Sea is closed. Ukraine has systematically destroyed or damaged Russian oil infrastructure around Novorossiysk. They’ve hit the loading facilities, they’ve struck the shadow fleet tankers Russia uses to evade sanctions. The Black Sea isn’t a viable export route anymore.
The Baltic is vulnerable. Russia’s oil now mostly flows through ports like Primorsk and Ust-Luga. But here’s the thing: those tankers have to transit past NATO countries - Poland, Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Finland. They sail through waters where NATO navies operate routinely.
The shadow fleet is legally questionable by design. Russia is using aging tankers with spoofed AIS transponders, registered through shell companies, often sailing under flags of convenience. These vessels exist in legal grey zones specifically to evade sanctions. Which means they’re... sanctioned vessels operating in international waters.
You see where this is going?
Letters of Marque and Other Forgotten Arts
Here’s something I learned digging into this: Letters of marque and reprisal are still technically legal. They’re right there in Article I, Section 8 of the US Constitution - Congress has the explicit power to grant them. They just haven’t been used since the 19th century because nations developed proper navies and piracy became less... respectable.
But the mechanism never went away. It just fell out of fashion.
For those not familiar with the concept: A letter of marque was essentially a license to commit piracy on behalf of your country. A privateer - a private vessel with a letter of marque - could seize enemy ships and cargo legally. They’d take the prize to a friendly port, have it condemned by an admiralty court, and split the proceeds with the sponsoring government.
One country’s pirate was another country’s privateer operating with proper legal authorization. In other words, it was state-sanctioned piracy with paperwork.
The practice died out not because it was outlawed (though various treaties tried), but because it became impractical when nations could afford large standing navies. Why rely on privateers when you can project power with your own warships?
But what happens when seizing sanctioned vessels becomes normalized as “enforcement”?
The Trap Russia Sees Coming
Let me paint you a picture of what Russian energy ministers fear most:
Ukraine has proven remarkably creative with asymmetric naval warfare. They’ve struck deep into Russian-held Crimea, hit the Kerch Bridge, damaged or destroyed numerous Russian naval vessels, all without having a traditional navy. They use drones, missiles, special operations - whatever works.
Now imagine Ukraine (or Poland, or any NATO country with a grudge and some naval capacity) decides that sanctioned Russian oil tankers are legitimate targets for seizure. Not sinking them - that might be an act of war. Just... seizing them. Taking the cargo. Bringing it to a friendly port where an admiralty court declares it a lawful prize.
The US just demonstrated that this is apparently acceptable international behavior. “Sanctioned vessel” + “international waters” = “we keep it, I guess.”
Russia’s shadow fleet operates dozens, maybe hundreds of vessels. Each one carrying millions of barrels of crude oil. Each one worth tens or hundreds of millions of dollars per voyage. Each one operating in legally questionable status specifically because they’re evading sanctions.
If seizure becomes the enforcement mechanism rather than just financial penalties, Russia’s entire oil export infrastructure becomes vulnerable. Not to military strikes that might trigger escalation, but to good old-fashioned prize-taking dressed up in modern legal language.
Congress could, theoretically, grant letters of marque to Ukrainian-flagged vessels. Or Polish ones. Or anyone willing to take the risk for a share of the proceeds. The constitutional authority is right there, unused but not abolished.
Wait, This Isn’t Hypothetical
So I was writing this piece, working through the implications of what might happen if privateering made a comeback, when I decided to do a little more research. And that’s when I discovered something that stopped me cold.
This isn’t speculation. It’s already happening.
In February 2025, Representative Tim Burchett (R-Tenn.) and Representative Mark Messmer (R-Ind.) introduced the “Cartel Marque and Reprisal Reauthorization Act of 2025.” Let me quote directly from the press release:
“The legislation would authorize President Trump to commission privately armed and equipped actors to seize the persons and property of any cartel, cartel member, or cartel-linked organizations.”
Read that again. “Privately armed and equipped actors.” That’s privateers. “Seize the persons and property.” That’s prize-taking. This is letters of marque, dusted off and aimed at “cartels.” Whatever that means.
Now, here’s where it gets interesting. Who determines what counts as a “cartel-linked organization”? The bill doesn’t specify strict criteria. It authorizes the President to make that determination.
A Venezuelan state oil company shipping crude? Could be cartel-linked - Venezuela’s been accused of working with drug traffickers. A Russian shadow fleet tanker moving sanctioned oil? Potentially connected to organizations that fund operations the US doesn’t like. Any vessel the administration decides is connected to sanctioned entities? Well, that’s up to the President to determine.
The tanker seizure wasn’t an improvised response to a specific situation. It was a proof of concept. The administration was testing the mechanism - can we seize vessels in international waters, claim the cargo, and face minimal consequences? Answer: apparently yes.
Now they’re moving to formalize and expand it through legislation.
One Country’s Pirate
I started writing this thinking I was exploring what might happen if privateering made a comeback. It turns out I was documenting what’s already in motion.
Russia’s foreign minister sees exactly what’s happening. His careful diplomatic language about “respect for other members of the world community” isn’t actually about principle. It’s about watching the United States normalize a tactic that could be turned against Russia with devastating effect.
Belle was right to call out the absurdity of Russia lecturing anyone about international norms. But the foreign minister’s concern is real, and it’s immediate. He’s not worried about Venezuelan tankers in some abstract sense. He’s worried because the mechanism for seizing Russian oil shipments is being built right now, in public, with legislative authorization.
Once you establish that seizing sanctioned vessels in international waters is legitimate state action - and that private actors can be commissioned to do it - you’ve opened a door that’s very hard to close. Russia’s entire economic lifeline flows through vessels that are sanctioned by definition and vulnerable by necessity.
The legislation hasn’t passed yet - it’s currently sitting in the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and historically most bills die in committee. But the fact that it exists at all, that it’s been formally introduced with bipartisan Republican support, that the mechanism has been spelled out in legislative language... that tells you the precedent is being actively built, whether or not this specific bill passes.
The age of privateering isn’t making a comeback. It never left. We just stopped calling it by that name for a while, and now we’re bringing back the old terminology because apparently we’ve run out of modern euphemisms.
Congress is literally considering drafting letters of marque in 2025. They’re calling it something else, aiming it at “cartels,” but the mechanism is identical to what Queen Elizabeth used against Spanish treasure ships. The only real difference is that our privateers might use speedboats and GPS instead of sailing ships and sextants.
Russia’s foreign minister knows exactly what precedent is being set here. That’s why he’s asking for explanation. Not because he expects a satisfying answer, but because he’s trying to establish that there should be some limiting principle before this gets turned around on them.
He’s right to be worried. The trap isn’t coming. It’s already been set.
The mongoose sees what the snake is worried about, even when the snake is trying very hard to look calm. Especially when Congress is helpfully writing out the trap design in bill form and posting it on their websites.
Jamie Mack writes about politics and systems from a basement in Utah. He is not a maritime law expert, just someone who notices when countries start acting like it’s 1805 again.


OMG!